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Abstract
We intend to narrow the gap between concrete implementations and veried models of
cryptographic protocols. We consider protocols implemented in F#, a variant of ML, and
veried using CryptoVerif, Blanchet's protocol verier for computational cryptography.
We experiment with compilers from F# code to CryptoVerif processes, and from Cryp-
toVerif declarations to F# code. We present two case studies: an implementation of the
Otway-Rees protocol, and an implementation of a simplied password-based authentica-
tion protocol. In both cases, we obtain concrete security guarantees for a computational
model closely related to executable code.
1 Introduction
There has been much progress in formal methods and tools for cryptography, enabling, in
principle, the automated verication of complex security protocols. In practice, however,
these methods and tools remain difcult to apply. Often, verication occurs independently of
the development process, rather than during early design, prototyping, and testing. Also, as
the protocol or its implementation evolve, it is difcult to carry over the guarantees of past
formal verication. More generally, the verication of a system that uses a given protocol
involves more than the cryptographic verication of an abstract model; it may rely as well on
more standard analyses of code (e.g. to ensure memory safety) and system conguration (e.g.
to protect a TCB). For these reasons, we are interested in the integration of protocol veriers
into the arsenal of software testing and verication tools.
In recent work, Bhargavan et al. [2] advocate the automatic extraction and verication of
cryptographic models from executable code. They verify protocol implementations written
in F# [13], a dialect of ML [10, 11], by compilation to ProVerif [3]. Their approach relies
on sharing as much code as possible between implementations and models: their code differs
mostly in the implementation of core cryptographic libraries, which use bitstrings for con-
crete execution and symbolic terms for verication. (Symbolic Dolev-Yao cryptography is
conveniently coded in ML as pattern matching on algebraic data types.)
In this work, we explore a similar approach to extend the benet of computational crypto-
graphic verication to protocol implementations. For automated verication, we rely on Cryp-
toVerif, Blanchet's recent tool for concrete cryptography [5, 6]. (We refer to these papers for
an explanation of CryptoVerif syntax and semantics.) We present experimental results based
on simple protocol implementations in F# for the Otway-Rees protocol and for a simplied
password-based authentication protocol. In both cases, we obtain computational verication
results for executable code. On the other hand, although we discuss their design, we have not
yet developed general, automated translations between ML and CryptoVerif.
1
Architecture The diagram below outlines our proposed architecture:
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We cross-compile between F# and CryptoVerif, as follows. In Section 2, given a CryptoVerif
le crypto.cv that declares cryptographic operations and assumptions, we generate two les:
an F# module interface crypto.fsi that exposes the cryptographic operations; and a symbolic
module implementation crypto-a.fs of this interface that supports the equations of crypto.cv.
In addition, we write by hand a concrete module implementation crypto.fs that calls .NET
implementations of standard algorithms. In Section 3, given an F# protocol implementation
protocol.fs written against crypto.fsi and a CryptoVerif le query.cv that describes target com-
putational security goals, we generate a CryptoVerif script protocol.cv. We can then execute
our protocol in three different ways:
 run CryptoVerif on protocol.cv, crypto.cv, and query.cv to verify our target properties;
 compile protocol.fs with crypto-a.fs and run the protocol symbolically for testing;
 compile protocol.fs with crypto.fs and run the protocol over some network.
To illustrate our approach, we implement the Otway-Rees protocol (Section 4) and a protocol
for password-based authentication (Section 5); the corresponding source les are available
at http://msr-inria.inria.fr/projects/sec/fs2cv/. We conclude in Sec-
tion 6.
2 From Cryptographic Assumptions to F#
Compared to symbolic models, computational models adopt a more concrete, less optimistic
approach to cryptography; they are also more complicated and typically involve probabilistic
polynomial-time semantics. In contrast to symbolic models, where the adversary can essen-
tially perform the same computations as ordinary protocol participants, computational models
specify both minimal positive assumptions (guaranteeing, for instance, that the correct decryp-
tion of an encrypted message yields the original plaintext) and minimal negative assumptions
(guaranteeing, for instance, that for a particular usage of encryption, a probabilistic polyno-
mial adversary cannot distinguish between two encrypted values).
In CryptoVerif scripts, cryptographic assumptions are introduced through type and func-
tion declarations, equations, inequalities, and game-based equivalences. We design a compiler
that translates the declarations and equations in a CryptoVerif le crypto.cv into an F# inter-
face crypto.fsi and its symbolic implementation crypto-a.fs.
Generating the F# Interface. Each CryptoVerif type declaration in crypto.cv is compiled to
an abstract type in crypto.fsi and a function that generates constant values of this type. For
example, type host[bounded] (representing host names) is compiled to the F# type declaration
type host and the function declaration val constHost: string! host. In addition, for each gen-
erative type (declared using the xed annotation), the interface also declares a function that
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generates fresh values of this type. Hence, type nonce[xed,large] (representing nonces) is
compiled to an additional function declaration val newNonce : unit! nonce.
Compiling function declarations is straightforward, with only a slight change in syn-
tax from CryptoVerif to F#. For example, fun enc(blocksize, key): blocksize is compiled to
val enc : (blocksize  key)! blocksize. For functions declared as decomposable, the compiler
additionally generates an inverse function. Hence, the CryptoVerif constructor concat4:
fun concat4(nonce, nonce, host, host):blocksize [compos]
is compiled to the two functions:
val concat4 : (nonce  nonce  host  host)! blocksize
val iconcat4 : blocksize! (nonce  nonce  host  host)
Generating a Symbolic Model. The compiler also generates an F# module crypto-a.fs that
symbolically implements crypto.fsi. This symbolic implementation uses ML datatypes and
pattern-matching to model cryptographic operations. It may rely on several pi-calculus primi-
tives: for communication (Pi.send, Pi.recv), for logging events (Pi.log), and for generating fresh
values (Pi.name). For example, the symbolic implementation of a nonce type is a pi-calculus
name, and the newNonce function uses Pi.name to generate a fresh nonce:
type nonce = N of Pi.name
let newNonce () : nonce = N (Pi.name "nonce")
Functions that have no equations constraining them are written as constructors of their re-
sult types, while functions dened through equations are written using pattern-matching. For
example, the symbolic model generated for symmetric encryption is as follows:
type blocksize = Enc of blocksize  key j ...
type key = KGen of keyseed j ...
let enc (b,k) = Enc(b,k)
let dec (e,k) = match (e,k) with
j (Enc(m,KGen(r)),KGen(r')) when r = r'!m
j ! failwith "decrypt failed"
Pattern-matching is also used to dene inverse functions such as iconcat4.
Writing a Concrete Implementation. Our concrete implementation crypto.fs uses the .NET
cryptography libraries. For example, the symmetric encryption function enc is dened using
the System.Security.Cryptography.RijndaelManaged class that implements AES encryption.
The choice of a library implementation that matches the cryptographic assumptions expressed
in crypto.cv should be carefully reviewed by a cryptographer. However, for a given set of
cryptographic assumptions, this review needs to occur only once: the concrete implementation
may then be used as a library module over and over again.
3 From Protocol Implementations to CryptoVerif
Wewrite protocol implementations as F# modules that use the cryptographic module crypto.fsi
and additional libraries, say for networking and events. The symbolic implementations of li-
braries may use the pi-calculus primitives; however their concrete implementations and the
protocol modules do not, instead they rely on .NET libraries. We design a compiler that trans-
lates protocol modules along with symbolic library implementations to CryptoVerif scripts.
The core of our translation is the same as in [2]: functions are translated to processes and
algebraic datatypes are translated to constructor functions.
Functions as Processes. As a rst step, the compiler attens all modules (with suitable
renaming of functions and values), inlines all non-recursive functions in the protocol code,
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and then eliminates all functions that are both unused and do not appear in any interface. It
then translates each remaining function to a CryptoVerif process. As a simple example, the
function let f x = x is compiled as a process let f = in(callf, x); out(resultf, x) where callf and
resultf are public channels (so that the opponent may call the function as an oracle). The pi-
calculus primitives are translated specially: Pi.send and Pi.recv compile to message sending
(out) and receiving (in); Pi.log triggers an event; Pi.name compiles to fresh name generation
(new).
Algebraic Datatypes. For each algebraic datatype, the compiler generates a CryptoVerif
type with decomposable constructors; hence, the implementation of a datatype is always
exposed to the opponent. For example, the type type t = A of blocksize is compiled to type
type t [bounded] and constructor fun A(blocksize):t [compos].
Top-level Process. For each value denition let x = e in the protocol code, the compiler
generates a process context that evaluates the expression e and binds the variable x. The top-
level process representing the full system thus consists of bindings for all value denitions and
N replicas of each function process, where N is a security parameter.
Assembling the CryptoVerif script. The full CryptoVerif script consists of the type decla-
rations, function declarations and processes generated above, the cryptographic assumptions
in crypto.cv, and the security goals in query.cv. Typical security goals include authentication
properties, expressed as (non-)injective correspondences between events, and strong secrecy
properties of keys and payloads.
4 Otway Rees
The Otway-Rees protocol [12] is a classic key-distribution protocol, in which a server S dis-
tributes a session key between A and B. It is included as a sample protocol in the CryptoVerif
distribution. The protocol has four messages; we detail only the rst message:
A! B : M jj A jj B jj enc(Na jjM jj A jj B;Kas)
where jj stands for concatenation and enc is the symmetric encryption function specied in
crypto.cv. The F# implementation for the role A computes the rst message as follows:
let Na = newNonce() in
let cab = concat3 M A B in
let ea1 = enc (concat2(Na,cab)) Kas in
Net.send AB (cab,ea1);
where concat2, concat3 are concatenation functions, and AB is a connection over a public
network intended for communications between A and B. The CryptoVerif code generated
from this excerpt is:
new Na : nonce;
let cab = concat3(M, A, B) in
let ea1 = enc(concat2(Na, cab), Kas) in
out(net, (cab, ea1));
Here, the nonce Na is sampled uniformly at random in the nonce type. The keyKas is bound
at the toplevel process as the result of running the key generation algorithm with a fresh seed.
All communications occur over a single global channel net.
For the generated script, CryptoVerif proves secrecy of the established key and mutual
authentication between A and B for any polynomial number of instances of the protocol.
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5 Password-Based Authentication
As a second example, we study the implementation of a simplied password-based authentica-
tion protocol (inspired by a web services security protocol with a richer message format [2]).
In this one-message protocol, A authenticates a text message to B using a shared password
pwd and B's public key:
A! B : text jj RSAenc(PKB ;HMACSHA1(pwd; text))
Hence,A computes a message authentication code (MAC) of the text keyed with pwd and then,
to prevent ofine dictionary attacks on the possibly guessable weak secret pwd,A encrypts the
MAC under B's public encryption key PKB .
Verifying authentication. In query.cv, we specify the desired authenticity of text as a corre-
spondence between two events in the F# codea begin event just before A sends the message
and an end event after B decrypts and checks the MAC. If we assume that pwd is a strong key,
CryptoVerif nds a proof of the correspondence.
Verifying weak secrecy. Even if pwd is only a weak secret, we would still like to protect it
against ofine guessing attacks [1, 4, 8, 7]; this motivated the MAC encryption in this protocol.
To this end, we disable B's code and add a secrecy goal to query.cv requiring that A's code
in isolation preserves the secrecy of pwd. CryptoVerif automatically nds a proof of strong
secrecy for pwd, guaranteeing the absence of ofine guessing attacks.
In contrast, the protocol does not protect pwd against online guessing attacks. In particular,
if B performs some visible action after accepting a message, the opponent can guess a pwd0
and then verify the guess by sending
I(A) ! B : text0 jj RSAenc(PKB ;HMACSHA1(pwd
0; text0))
If B visibly accepts the message, the opponent then infers pwd = pwd'. Indeed, if our gener-
ated code for B is enabled, CryptoVerif fails to prove the strong secrecy of pwd.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Although our initial results are encouraging, numerous difculties remain. Reecting the
specicity of the underlying cryptographic games, CryptoVerif seems more sensitive to the
code structure than symbolic tools; this may hinder the direct verication of production code,
and require preliminary code transforms. Also, for larger protocols, it is necessary to (safely)
erase code that is irrelevant to the proof of a given property. More theoretically, it would be
interesting to characterize our target security properties in F#.
After implementing the compilers outlined in this paper, we would like to consider more
serious case studies, such as a reference implementation of a standard protocol. We would
also like to develop veried cryptographic libraries in F#, in order to encapsulate the standard
usage of selected cryptographic primitives.
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